Abstract. Consider RSA with N = pq, q < p < 2q, public encryption exponent e and private decryption exponent d. We first study cryptanalysis of RSA when certain amount of the Most Significant Bits ( 
Introduction
RSA [20] is one of the most popular cryptosystems in the history of cryptology. Here, we use the standard notations in RSA as follows:
• primes p, q, with q < p < 2q;
• N = pq, φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1);
• e, d are such that ed = 1 + kφ(N ), k ≥ 1;
• N, e are publicly available and message M is encrypted as C = M e mod N ;
• the secret key d is required to decrypt the cipher as M = C d mod N .
Though RSA is quite safe till date if applied with proper cryptographic practices, the literature related to its cryptanalysis is quite rich. RSA is found to be weak when the prime factors of any one of p ± 1, q ± 1 is small [19, 28] . In [11] , it has been pointed out that short public exponents may cause weakness if the same message is broadcast to many parties. One very important result regarding RSA weak keys has been presented in [27] , where it has been shown that N can be factored from the knowledge of N, e if d < [21] that the idea of [27] cannot be substantially extended further than the bound of d as O(N 1 4 ), many papers [3, 9, 25, 26] used the idea of Continued Fraction (CF) expression to get different kinds of weak keys in RSA (one may follow the material from [22, Chapter 5] for basics of CF expression and related results). The seminal idea of [8] using lattice based techniques has also been exploited in great detail [5, 1] to find weak keys of RSA when d < N 0.292 . An outstanding survey on the attacks on RSA before the year 2000 is available in [4] . For very recent results on RSA, one may refer to [13, 17] and the references therein.
One important model of cryptanalysis is the side channel attack such as fault attacks, timing attacks, power analysis etc. [6, 7, 14, 15] , by which an adversary may obtain some bits of the private key d. In [6] , it has been studied how many bits of d need to be known to mount an attack on RSA. The constraint in the work of [6] was the upper bound on e which is √ N . The study attracted interest and the idea of [6] has been improved in [2] where the bound of e was increased upto N 0.725 . Then the work of [10] improved the result for full size public exponent e. We present further improvement over the work of [10] noting that if one guesses a few MSBs of p, then the requirement on the number of bits in d gets substantially reduced.
As an example (see Example 1 later) with practical parameters, for a specific 1024 bit N and 309 bit d, the idea of [10] requires 112 many MSBs of d to be exposed, whereas, our idea requires only 80 MSBs of d with a guess of 21 bits of MSBs in p. First of all, the total requirement of bits to be known in our case is 80 + 21 = 101, which is 11 bits less than the 112 many bits to be known in [10] . More importantly, one needs to know the bits of d by side channel attacks and a reduction of 112 − 80 = 32 bits makes the chance of this kind of attack more realistic. Further, with higher lattice dimension we get even more interesting results where as less as 53 many MSBs of d are required with the knowledge of 21 many MSBs of p.
One may note that given the constraint q < p < 2q, a few bits of p, q can be known in polynomial time (e.g., around 7 bits for 1024 bit N and 9 bits for 2048 bit N following the work of [23] ). This will indeed reduce the search effort further for guessing a few MSBs of p.
As we use different notations in this paper compared to [10] , let us list the results of [10] with our notations here. Let d be of bitsize δ log 2 N . Given (δ − γ) log 2 N many MSBs of d, the product N can be factored in probabilistic polynomial time [10] (we ignore the term as given in [10] ) if
There are also some results in [10] , where cryptanalysis of RSA is studied when some LSBs of d are known.
In this paper we use similar kind of analysis as in [10] and explain different cases relevant to the attacks. The theoretical results are presented in Theorems 2.1, 2.3. The advantages of our work over [10] are as follows.
(1) Given that a few MSBs of p can be guessed, the requirement of MSBs of d in our attack is less than that of [10] (where no guess on p is made). (2) The total amount of bits, to be known considering the MSBs of both p, d in our case, is less than the number of MSBs to be known for d as reported in [10] . (3) In Theorem 3.1, we have also studied the cryptanalysis of RSA when some MSBs of p along with the LSBs of d are known and our results are better than that of [10] .
We also study the RSA variant proposed in [24] , where e, d are more than √ N , but significantly less than N . The data used in [24] considered e, d of the order of N τ , where τ ≈ 0.6, say. As, ed = 1 + kφ(N ), the value of k is of the order of N 2τ −1 , which is significantly smaller than N . Consider that the number of bits in k is k b ; then we find that one needs to know k b many MSBs of d to cryptanalyze RSA. This result is presented in Theorem 5.1.
The lattice based technique used here is similar to what presented in [10] . However, in [10] , a full size public exponent (i.e., e of the order of N ) or a full size private exponent (i.e., d of the order of N ) has been considered separately. In this paper, we take e = N α and d ≤ N δ to get generalized results. Our theoretical results are supported by experimental evidences. We have implemented the programs in SAGE 2.10.1 over Linux Ubuntu 7.04 on a computer with Dual CORE Intel(R) Pentium(R) D CPU 2.80 GHz, 1 GB RAM and 2 MB Cache.
While comparing our experimental results with that of [10] , we implement the idea of [10] on our own platform. As all the parameters for the experiments in [10] may not be the same with our implementations, the results may vary a little. We point out the exact experimental values presented in [10] as and when required.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Next we present brief preliminaries. In Section 2, we study the key exposure attacks when the MSBs of d are exposed. Similar study continues in Section 3 where it is considered that some LSBs of d is known. Section 4 lists the experimental results corresponding to the theoretical results presented in Sections 2, 3. In Section 5, we discuss the effect of partial key exposure attack on the RSA variant presented in [24] . Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
Let us present some basics on lattice reduction techniques. Consider the linearly independent vectors u 1 , . . . , u w ∈ Z n , when w ≤ n. A lattice, spanned by u 1 , . . . , u w , is the set of all linear combinations of u 1 , . . . , u w , i.e., w is the dimension of the lattice. A lattice is called full rank when w = n. Let •
• For all i, In [8] , techniques have been discussed to find small integer roots of polynomials in a single variable mod n, and of polynomials in two variables over the integers. The idea of [8] extends to more than two variables also, but the method becomes probabilistic. The following theorem is also relevant to the idea of [8] .
implies that if polynomials b 1 , b 2 (corresponding to the two shortest reduced basis vectors) have roots over 0 mod n, then those roots hold over integers also. The solutions corresponding to each unknown is achieved by calculating the resultant of two polynomials (if they are algebraically independent) and then finding the solution of the resultant.
MSBs of d and p known
In this section we consider that certain amount of MSBs of both d, p will be available. We will study to methods following the ideas of [10] .
MSBs of d and p known: Method I
Let us start with the following result.
). This can be rewritten as ed 1 β (however, we ignore the constant term in the proof as in [10] ). Now let us fix the lattice parameters m, t. Define
In order to work with a polynomial having the constant term 1, we define
(During the experiments, as long as gcd(R, n) = 1, we keep on increasing n by 1.) Then we use the shifts
Now we build a lattice L with the basis elements coming from the coefficient vectors of g ijk (xX, yY, zZ), h ijk (xX, yY, zZ), g ijk (xX, yY, zZ) and h ijk (xX, yY, zZ) following the idea of [10] . The vectors are ordered in such a manner that the matrix corresponding to the lattice L becomes triangular, and the diagonal entries of g and h are equal to (XY ) m Z m+t . Then we follow the similar computation as in [10 
Now we construct two resultants G 1 , G 2 taking two different pairs from f M SB1 , f 1 , f 2 (in our experiments, mostly, G 1 is constructed using f M SB1 , f 1 and G 2 is constructed using f M SB1 , f 2 ). Then we construct the resultant of G 1 , G 2 to get G. The integer root(s) of G provide z 0 , which in turn gives the primes. We assume that the resultant computations for multivariate polynomials constructed in our approach yield non-zero polynomials. This is successful in most of the cases in our experiment. However, as this step involves some probability of success, we consider the algorithm as probabilistic. As each of lattice reduction, resultant computation and root finding is polynomial time algorithm in log 2 N , the product N can be factored in probabilistic polynomial time given the constraints in this theorem.
Here
Putting the optimal value of τ , which is τ =
in Inequality (2) we get the required condition
When e is O(N ), we have e = cN for some constant 0 < c < φ(N ) N as e < φ(N ). Thus, putting α = 1 and ignoring the constant term, we get the following corollary. 
One may note that putting β = One should note that the total requirement of bits to be known in our case is 84 + 20 = 104, which is less than the requirement of 106 bits in [10] . The number of MSBs of d to be exposed in [10] is (δ − γ 1 ) log 2 N (we denote γ by γ 1 here). In our case, the requirement of MSBs in p is (0.5 − β) log 2 N and that of d is (δ − γ 2 ) log 2 N (we denote γ by γ 2 here), and adding them we get the total requirement of MSBs (considering
. This theoretically justifies the advantage of our technique. As we will work with low lattice dimensions, the actual requirement of MSBs to be known will be higher in experimental results than the numerical values arrived from the theoretical results. This is explained in detail in Table 1 .
Based on Corollary 2.2, we get the following probabilistic polynomial time algorithm.
Algorithm 1. Inputs:
N, e = N α , and N δ , the upper bound of d.
, and One may also consider guessing MSBs of p+q rather than p as the polynomial f M SB1 deals with p + q rather than p and q. Experimental results of [23] show that around 12 many MSBs of p + q can be estimated correctly for the 1024-bit N , whereas the estimation gives around 7 many MSBs for p. Consider that b 1 many MSBs of p are known (p is estimated by p ) and we estimate q by q = N p . Further, let us assume that the estimation p + q has b 2 many MSBs identical with the exact value p + q. Then experimentally we observed that b 2 > b 1 in general and for b 1 = 7, we get b 2 = 12 on an average. This shows that the effect of guessing the MSBs of p or p + q are same.
MSBs of d and p known: Method II
We start this section with the following theorem. 
Hence we have to find the solution of the polynomial
, and one can check that they are the upper bounds of x 0 , y 0 , z 0 neglecting the small constant multipliers. Now let us fix the lattice parameters m, t. Define
In order to work with a polynomial with constant term 1, we define
Now we build a lattice L with the basis elements coming from the coefficient vectors of g ijk (xX, yY, zZ), h ijk (xX, yY, zZ), g ijk (xX, yY, zZ) and h ijk (xX, yY, zZ) following the idea of [10] . The vectors are ordered in such a manner that the matrix corresponding to the lattice L becomes triangular, and the diagonal entries of g and h are equal to X m Y m+t Z m . We give an example of the lattice below with m = 1 and t = 0.
we get polynomials f 1 and f 2 (the first two elements after lattice reduction using LLL algorithm) that satisfy the Howgrave-Graham bound as described in Theorem 1.1. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.1, we construct two resultants G 1 , G 2 taking two different pairs from f M SB2 , f 1 , f 2 . Then we construct the resultant of G 1 , G 2 to get G. The integer root(s) of G provide z 0 , which in turn gives the prime. The complete operation works in probabilistic poly(log 2 N ) time.
So the Inequality (3) holds if,
, in Inequality (4) we get the required condition γ ≤
When e is O(N ), we have e = cN for some constant 0 < c < φ(N ) N as e < φ(N ). Thus, putting α = 1 and ignoring the constant term, we get the following corollary. . As we have knowledge of a few MSBs of p, the value of β decreases below 1 2 in our case, increasing the value of γ. As δ − γ proportion of bits of d needs to be known for the attack, we require less number of MSBs of d to be exposed than [10] .
Similar to Algorithm 1 corresponding to Corollary 2.2, one can devise a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm following Corollary 2.4.
Comparison of Methods I and II
In Theorem 2.1, we have
and in Theorem 2.3, we get 
is valid for δ ≥ . We need (δ − γ) log 2 N many MSBs of d to factor N and thus when the upper bound of γ is larger, one gets the better result. Now, 
LSBs of d and MSBs of p known
In [10, Theorem 3], the cryptanalysis of RSA has been studied when some LSBs of d are exposed. We here extend the idea with the additional idea that a few MSBs of p are also known. This gives the following theorem. We present the proof briefly as the technique is similar to Theorem 2.1. 
. This polynomial is same as the polynomial f M SB1 in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Thus, using similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we get the constraint as
Putting β = 1 2 in Corollary 3.2, we get the same bound as in [10, Theorem 3]. As we have the knowledge of a few MSBs of p, the value of β decreases below 1 2 in our case, increasing the value of γ. As δ − γ proportion of bits of d needs to be known for the attack, we require less number of LSBs of d to be exposed than [10] .
Similar to Algorithm 1 corresponding to Corollary 2.2, one can devise a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm following Corollary 3.2.
In the next section we present experimental results with all the relevant data that highlights the improvement achieved by our technique.
Experimental results
As we will work with low lattice dimensions, the actual requirement of MSBs to be known will be higher in experimental results than the numerical values arrived from the theoretical results. In all the examples in this section, we consider e is O(N ), i.e., α = 1.
Let us first present an example corresponding to Corollary 2. [23] , around 7 MSBs of p may be known in polynomial time and hence we need 2 21−7 many guesses for p, which requires less than 7 hours in our experimental set-up. The existing works on partial key exposure attacks will not work with the knowledge of only 80 bits of MSBs that we achieve here.
Considering a higher lattice dimension, m = t = 2, i.e., w = 40, factoring N requires knowledge of 110 many MSBs of d using the idea of [10] . This requires 53.03 seconds. According to experimental results in [10, Figure 5 ], this should require around 93 MSBs of d. In our case, we require only 53 MSBs of d and 21 MSBs of p to factor N that requires 46.25 seconds; thus the total requirement is 53 + 21 = 74 many bits. Considering that 7 many MSBs of p may be known using the idea of [23] , the overall attack will take a day in a cluster of 9 machines.
In Table 1 First, we consider that only 80 MSBs of d will be leaked and studied the requirement of the MSBs of p for the attack. In each case, the algorithm of [10] has also been executed and the requirement of the minimum number of MSBs for d is presented. Next, we consider that 150 MSBs of d will be exposed for our attack. The results of Table 1 clearly identifies the improvement through our approach over the idea of [10] . Now we present an example corresponding to Corollary 2.4. First we work with the case m = t = 1, i.e., lattice dimension w = 20. Factoring N requires the knowledge of 572 many MSBs of d using the method of [10] , whereas, our technique requires 517 many MSBs of d and 31 many MSBs of p. Both the techniques require around 7.5 seconds on our platform. Following the idea of [23] , around 7 MSBs of p may be known in polynomial time and hence we need 2 31−7 many guesses for p, which requires around a day in a cluster of 2 10 machines. The existing works on partial key exposure attacks will not work with the knowledge of only 517 bits of MSBs that we achieve here. Further the total requirement of unknown bits in our case is 517 + 31 = 548 which is less than 572.
With higher lattice dimension, m = t = 2, i.e., w = 50, factoring N requires 527 many MSBs of d using the idea of [10] . This takes 859.64 seconds. In our case, it is enough to know 494 MSBs of d with 31 MSBs of p. The time required is 887.22 seconds.
We now present the experimental details of 10 runs with 10 different 1024 bits N in Table 2 . We consider that only 517 many MSBs of d will be leaked and then study the requirement of the MSBs of p for our attack. In each case, the algorithm of [10] has also been executed and the requirement of the minimum number of MSBs for d is presented. The results of Table 2 clearly identifies the improvement through our approach over the idea of [10] . First we work with the case m = t = 1, i.e., lattice dimension w = 16. Factoring N requires the knowledge of 115 many LSBs of d using the method of [10] , whereas, our technique requires 80 many LSBs of d and 23 many MSBs of p. Both the techniques requires little less than 1.5 seconds on our platform. Following the idea of [23] , around 7 MSBs of p may be known in polynomial time and hence we need 2 23−7 many guesses for p, which requires a day in our experimental set-up.
When we work with higher lattice dimension m = t = 2, i.e., w = 40, factoring N requires 112 LSBs of d using the idea of [10] . It takes 46.39 seconds. We now present the experimental details of 10 runs in Table 3 considering 10 different 1024 bits N . We consider that only 80 many LSBs of d will be leaked and then study the requirement of the MSBs of p for the attack. In each case, the algorithm of [10] has also been executed and the requirement of the minimum number of LSBs for [10] is presented. The results of Table 3 clearly identifies the improvement through our approach over the idea of [10] . 5. Key exposure attacks on RSA variant proposed in [24] In [24] , Sun and Yang proposed a variant of RSA where the public encryption exponent e and the private decryption exponent d are such that log 2 e+log 2 d ≈ log 2 N + l k , where l k is a positive integer. The main idea was to keep the bit size d as well as e quite less and the value of l k is related to the security of this variant of RSA. The examples in [24] used l k = 112. Below we present the result that gives a view of key exposure attack in such a scenario. Since
. Since e > p + q, we get the exact value of p + q from the above relation, when k is known. From p + q one can factor N easily.
For the examples presented in [24] , we note that δ + α − 3 2 < 0. In such a case, we get the following corollary from the above theorem. Let us take one example from [24] and show how the idea of Theorem 5.1 can be exploited in partial key exposure attack. • If we consider that 20 many MSBs of p are known then β = 0.48093.
Here we have γ = 0.18953 and we need to know (δ − γ) log 2 N many MSBs of d which is 318 in this case. Thus the total requirement of bits to be known is 20 + 318 = 338.
• We perform an experiment corresponding to Method I, with parameters m = 2, t = 2, i.e., lattice dimension ω = 40. In this case we need 388 many MSBs of d and 20 many MSBs of p and the time required is 37.5 seconds. Thus the total requirement of bits to be known is 20 + 388 = 408.
Now we present examples with Method II (based on the idea of Theorem 2.3). First we consider the p, q, e, d as in Example 4.
• If we consider that 20 many MSBs of p are known then β = 0.48093.
Here we have γ = 0.41050 and we need to know (δ − γ) log 2 N many MSBs of d which is 92 in this case. Thus the total requirement of bits to be known is 20 + 92 = 112.
• We perform an experiment corresponding to Method II, with parameters m = 2, t = 2, i.e., lattice dimension ω = 50. In this case we need 99 many MSBs of d and 20 many MSBs of p and the time required is 553.8 seconds. Thus the total requirement of bits to be known is 20 + 99 = 119.
• It is clear that Method I performs better than Method II when we consider the RSA variant of [24] .
With the same primes presented in Example 4, we take the value of d two more than what presented in Example 4. With this new setup, the results using Method II are as follows.
Here we have γ = 0.20207 and we need to know (δ − γ) log 2 N many MSBs of d which is 305 in this case. Thus the total requirement of bits to be known is 20 + 305 = 325.
• We perform an experiment corresponding to Method II, with parameters m = 2, t = 2, i.e., lattice dimension ω = 50. In this case we need 363 many MSBs of d and 20 many MSBs of p and the time required is 1217.9 seconds. Thus the total requirement of bits to be known is 20 + 363 = 383.
• One may note that Method II performs better than Method I when we consider RSA with e of the order of N . Our study shows that much higher key exposure is required when e is O(N ) than in case of the RSA variant [24] , when e is smaller.
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied cryptanalysis of RSA when either certain amount of MSBs or certain amount of LSBs of d are exposed. Our additional idea is to guess a few MSBs of the secret prime p. With this additional information, we find that our technique is more efficient than that of [10] (where no guess on the bits of p is attempted) in terms of the amount of bits of d to be exposed. Our technique is also better if one considers total number of bits to be known from d, p together than that of d only in [10] . Our theoretical results are implemented and we present experimental evidences of 1024 bits N , that can be factored with the exposure of considerably less amount of bits in d than [10] with a guess of a few MSBs in p that can be searched exhaustively (say around 20 to 30 bits). We also study an RSA variant proposed in [24] and analyze the effect of partial key exposure attack on this scheme. 
